Utah v. Juan Anthony Portillo : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Utah v. Juan Anthony Portillo : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; James R. Taylor;
Deputy Utah County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Juan Anthony Portillo, No. 940387 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3067
KFl? 
45.9 
BRIE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF JlPJALj^ flf Qf) OfcQCft 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940387-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION AND/OR 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA, TWO ENHANCED SECOND 
DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-
37-8(1)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8(1)(b) (SUPP. 1995), AND ONE 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY FOR THE SAME UNDER SECTION 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii); POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
MARIJUANA, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) SUPP. 1995); FAILURE TO 
OBTAIN DRUG TAX STAMPS, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-103 AND 59-19-104 
(1992); AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-
5(1) (1994), IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, PRESIDING. 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAMES R. TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East #2100 
Provo, Utah 04606 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED FILED 
DEC - 8 1999 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940387-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION AND/OR 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA, TWO ENHANCED SECOND 
DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§58-
37-8(1)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8(1)(b) (SUPP. 1995), AND ONE 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY FOR THE SAME UNDER SECTION 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii); POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
MARIJUANA, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) SUPP. 1995); FAILURE TO 
OBTAIN DRUG TAX STAMPS, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-103 AND 59-19-104 
(1992); AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-
5(1) (1994), IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, PRESIDING. 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
JAMES R. TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED WHEN IT INFORMED 
THE JURY VENIRE OF THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES 
FOR THE CHARGED OFFENSES DURING ITS VOIR 
DIRE OF THE JURY VENIRE; INDEED, THE TRIAL 
COURT INSTRUCTED THE SUBSEQUENTLY IMPANELED 
JURY NOT TO CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES 
IN ARRIVING AT THEIR VERDICT AND THEREBY CURED 
ANY ARGUABLE PREJUDICE 8 
A. Proceedings Below 8 
B. Plain Error Standard 10 
C. Proper Venire Voir Dire 11 
D. No Obvious Error 13 
E. Curative Instruction Defeats Claim of 
Prejudice 14 
POINT II. DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM OF PLAIN 
ERROR REGARDING THE PRECISE TERMINOLOGY AND 
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS LISTED IN ELEMENTS 
INSTRUCTIONS ##4-5; INDEED, ERROR, IF ANY, 
WAS FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT 15 
A. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury 
Using the Term Violation in Lieu of the Term 
Conviction 16 
1 
B. Error, if Any, in Requiring Jury to Find 
That Counts II and/or III Constituted Second 
Or Subsequent Offenses Was Favorable to 
Defendant 23 
POINT III THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING 
REVERSAL 27 
POINT IV DEFENDANT WAS EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY TRIAL 
COUNSEL 28 
CONCLUSION 31 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Transcripts; Jury Instruction #26 
Addendum B - Jury Instructions #3-5, 13, 20; Jury 
Question 
Addendum C - Utah Code Ann §58-37-8(Supp. 1995) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 2 
United States v. Calandrella. 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979) . 15 
United States v. Davidson. 367 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1966) . . . 13 
STATE CASES 
State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978) 24, 25, 26 
Commonwealth v. White, 531 A.2d 806 (Pa.Super. 1987), 
appeal denied. 553 A.2d 967 (Pa. 1988) 12 
Jones v. State. 764 P.2d 914 (Okl.Cr.App. 1988) 23 
Salt Lake Citv v. Tuero. 745 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1987) . . 12 
Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980) . . . 26 
State v. Alv. 782 P.2d 549 (Utah App. 1989) 18 
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 28 
State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, granted. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) 29, 30 
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied. U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995) 23 
State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) 18 
State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) 17 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 30, 31 
State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992) . 2, 11, 30 
State v. Enno. 807 P.2d 610 (Idaho 1991) 22 
State v. James. 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989) 27 
State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) 18 
State v. Koch. 673 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1983) 14 
• •• 
111 
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994). cert. 
granted on other grounds. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995) . . 13, 25 
State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990) . 20 
State v. Menzies. 889 P. 2d 393 (Utah 1994) passim 
State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993) . . . . 2, 27, 28, 29 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) 19 
State v. Reav. 810 P.2d 512 (Wash. App.), 
review denied. 816 P.2d 1225 (Wash. 1991) 15, 23 
State v. Schad. 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 1981), cert, denied. 
455 U.S. 983 (1982) 23 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 11 
State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986) 18 
State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981) 18 
State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983) 11, 12, 13 
State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . . 2,3 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Hunt. No. 940267 (Utah November 9, 1995) . 6, 19, 27 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-5 (1994) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1995) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 (1992) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-104 (1992) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1995) 11 
Utah R. App. P. 24 28 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940387-CA 
v. : 
JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution 
and/or arranging to distribute marijuana, two enhanced second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8(1) (b) (Supp. 1995), and one third degree 
felony for the same under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii); possession 
with intent to distribute marijuana, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995); 
failure to obtain drug tax stamps, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-103 and 59-19-104 (1992); 
and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly voir dire the jury 
venire concerning the applicable penalties and amy potential 
penalty bias they might have? 
Defendant acknowledges that this issue was not raised 
below; consequently, the issue may not be reviewed on appeal 
unless defendant can establish plain error. This requires 
error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. If any one 
of these elements is missing, there can be no finding of plain 
error," State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). Accord State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
174 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that 
it could not convict defendant for the enhanced drug offenses 
charged in counts II and III of the information, unless it first 
determined that those offenses constituted second or subsequent 
violations of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1995)? 
Defendant acknowledges that this issue was similarly 
not raised below; accordingly, the plain error standard applies 
here as well. 
3. Does the claimed cumulative effect of the above 
alleged errors require reversal? 
Whether the cumulative effect of claimed individual 
errors requires reversal turns on whether the errors as a whole 
undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 86 0 P.2d 
339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
4. Was defendant effectively assisted by trial 
counsel? When reviewed solely upon the trial record, appellate 
review for counsel effectiveness is necessarily conducted de 
novo; however, ,f [jJudicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must 
be highly deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689 (1984) . See also State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 
2 
App. 1993) ("td]espite the application of a standard normally 
bereft of deference, appellate review of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent portion of the drug statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1995), is contained in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with various felony drug related 
offenses including several counts of distributing and/or 
arranging to distribute marijuana and singular counts of 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, failure to obtain 
drug tax stamps, and possession of paraphernalia (R. 1-2). 
Following a jury trial held September 20-21, 1993, 
defendant was convicted as charged (R. 108-07). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two terms of 
from one to 15 years; three terms of not more than five years; 
and one six month term (R. 117-14). All terms were to run 
concurrently and defendant received credit for time served. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On three different dates in October 1991, the Utah 
County Narcotics Enforcement Task Force set up controlled buys of 
marijuana from defendant at his Provo, Utah, residence (Tr. Vol. 
I at 65-86, 103, 122-41, 211, 265-69). The controlled buys were 
arranged and conducted by then confidential informant, George 
Quintana, defendant's former roommate, using cash supplied to him 
by the task force (Tr. Vol. I at 74, 209-14). According to task 
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force procedure, Quintana's person and vehicle were searched 
before and after each controlled buy (Tr. Vol. I at 65, 211-212). 
Following the first and second controlled buys, conducted on 
October 9th and October 15th, Quintana produced 1/8 ounce baggies 
of marijuana which he had purchased from defendant for 
approximately $40 (Tr. Vol. I at 71-74, 127, 212). 
Approximately one hour after the third and last 
controlled buy, on October 25, 1991, investigating officers 
obtained and executed a search warrant for defendant's residence 
(Tr. Vol. I at 86). Defendant was the only person inside the 
residence at the time the search was conducted. Id. The 
searching officers seized the money defendant had just received 
from Quintana in exchange for marijuana (Tr. Vol. I at 113-114, 
150), two sets of scales and other paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, 
three baggies each containing approximately two grams of crushed 
marijuana, and a box containing approximately 41 grams of crushed 
marijuana (Tr. Vol. II at 277-78). The above described 
controlled buys form the basis for the drug distribution offenses 
charged in counts I-III. 
At trial, defendant claimed that he could not have been 
involved in any of the controlled buys because he was out of town 
from September 24, 1991 to October 20, 1991, when he returned 
briefly before departing again later that day and that he did not 
return to Provo until approximately 20 minutes before his arrest 
on October 25, 1991 (Tr. Vol. II at 321-22, 327). Defendant 
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claimed that he left Quintana in charge of his house and van 
while he was gone (Tr. Vol. II at 324). 
Defendant further claimed that the seized scales and 
buy-owe sheets related to his business selling fruits and 
vegetables, particularly, chili peppers (Tr. Vol. II at 379, 
386). As for the seized marijuana, defendant claimed that it 
belonged to Quintana and other individuals that he let stay in 
his house, and that he had not previously noticed any marijuana 
inside the house (Tr. Vol. II at 331-33). Finally, defendant 
claimed that the money seized from his person was rent money, 
left for him by the above-mentioned individuals (Tr. Vol. II at 
332). The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 108-07). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGDMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred in 
two instances. First, by informing the jury venire of the 
potential penalties. This claim fails because it is well 
established that voir dire examination has as its proper purposes 
both the detection of actual bias, and the collection of data to 
permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge. Thus, the 
trial court's venire voir dire in this case afforded the parties 
an opportunity to explore whether any venire member held a 
particular penalty bias that would interfere with the reaching of 
an impartial verdict. So viewed, the trial court's voir dire 
does not constitute error, let alone obvious error. Further, the 
trial court instructed the subsequently impaneled jury that it 
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was not to consider the potential penalties in arriving at a 
verdict, defeating any assertion of prejudice. Defendant's claim 
can be rejected on any one of the above grounds. 
POINT II 
Second, defendant claims that elements instructions 
##4-5 are plainly erroneous because they require the jury to find 
that counts II and/or III constitute prior violations of the drug 
statute instead of prior convictions consistent with the precise 
wording of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (Supp. 1995). He 
further claims the instructions are plainly erroneous because 
they require the jury to convict for count I as an element of 
counts II and/or III. In the first instance, there is no 
requirement that jury instructions must precisely track the 
pertinent statutory language; rather, the precise wording and 
specificity of jury instructions is soundly left to the trial 
court's discretion. Moreover, State v. Hunt, No. 940267, slip 
op. at 4 (Utah November 9, 1995), clarifies that the term 
conviction as used in section 58-37-8(1)(b) means not a judgment 
of conviction, but rather a detennination of guilt by a verdict 
or plea. In light of this clarification, defendant articulates 
no compelling reason that the term violation cannot be reasonably 
interchanged for the term conviction as it used in 58-37-8(1) (b). 
In the second instance, error, if any, in requiring the 
jury to convict for count I as an element of counts II and/or 
count III was favorable error. Indeed, in so requiring, 
instructions ##4-5 enumerated more elements for conviction than 
€ 
the drug statute otherwise required and thereby increased the 
likelihood of acquittal on counts II and/or III if the jury could 
not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was also 
guilty of count I. Without this additional element, the jury was 
free to convict defendant for counts II and/or III regardless of 
its determination to convict, or not, for count I. Thus, neither 
of the above claims demonstrate any instance of prejudicial 
error. 
Point III 
Additionally, defendant claims that even if the above 
alleged errors are not individually harmful, their cumulative 
prejudicial effect requires reversal. The Court should reject 
defendant's claim of cumulative error for failure to support it 
with any meaningful analysis and to establish that any one of the 
above allegations constitutes error. 
Point IV 
Finally, as an alternative means for reviewing his 
allegations of plain error in Points I and II defendant asserts 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the trial court's venire voir dire and elements instructions. 
Because the plain error and ineffective assistance standards both 
require a showing of prejudice which is not made out here, 
defendant is unable to succeed under his ineffective assistance 
theory for the same reasons he is unable to succeed under a plain 
error theory. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED WHEN IT 
INFORMED THE JURY VENIRE OF THE 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES FOR THE CHARGED 
OFFENSES DURING ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE 
JURY VENIRE; INDEED, THE TRIAL COURT 
INSTRUCTED THE SUBSEQUENTLY IMPANELED 
JURY NOT TO CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL 
PENALTIES IN ARRIVING AT THEIR 
VERDICT AND THEREBY CURED ANY 
ARGUABLE PREJUDICE 
Defendant complains that the trial court committed 
plain error during its voir dire of the jury venire by informing 
the venire of the penalties applicable to the charged offenses. 
Because defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court 
erred, let alone that the alleged error was obvious and 
prejudicial, the Court should reject his claim. State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994). 
A. Proceedings Below 
During the course of venire voir dire the trial court 
instructed the prospective jurors as follows: 
THE COURT: Thank you. I've advised 
you that this is a drug case. And I 
will, on the record once again, 
advise you of the nature of the 
charges involved. 
Count 1 is distribution or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance. 
That's a third-degree felony. That's 
punishable by incarceration in the 
Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate period of time, not to 
exceed five years, together with up 
to a $5,000 find and/or both--
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Count 2, ladies and gentlemen, is 
distribution of or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance. 
That's a second-degree felony. It's 
also punishable by an indeterminate 
time at the Utah State Prison, not 
less than one nor more than 15 years 
in the Utah State Prison, together 
with up to a $10,000 fine and/or 
both. 
Count 3 is distribution of or 
arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance, also a second-degree 
felony. It would carry a maximum, 
also, for an indeterminate time, not 
less than one nor more than 15 years 
in the Utah State Prison together 
with a fine not to exceed $10,000 
and/or both. 
Count 4 is possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to 
distribute. That's a third-degree 
felony, carrying the possible 
imposition of an indeterminate time 
from zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison together with a fine up 
to $5,000 and/or both. 
Count 5 is unlawful possession or use 
of drug paraphernalia. That's a 
class-B misdemeanor. It's punishable 
by incarceration in the Utah County 
Jail for a period not to exceed six 
months together with a fine up to 
$1,000 and/or both. 
And Count 6 is illegal drug tax. 
That's a third degree felony. That's 
also punishable by an indeterminate 
time in the Utah State Prison not to 
exceed five years together with a 
fine up to $5,000 and/or both. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 14-17) (the pertinent transcript pages are 
contained in addendum A). 
Additionally, the trial court informed members of the 
jury venire that they were to be the "exclusive triers of the 
9 
i 
fact(s)," and that they would also make the ultimate 
"determination about credibility of witnesses" (Tr. Vol. I at 
17), see addendum A. The court then proceeded to voir dire the 
venire and specifically inquired if any venire member f!believ[ed] 
that the punishment fixed by law is too severe or too light for 
the offenses charged?" (Tr. Vol. I at 34), see addendum A. No 
i 
venire person audibly responded to the court's question and 
defendant raised no objection. Id. 
Finally, in its formal instructions to the ultimately 
impaneled jury, the trial court cautioned: 
In arriving at a verdict in this 
case, you shall not discuss nor 
consider the subject of penalty or 
punishment, as that is a matter which 
lies with the court, and other court 
proceedings. The penalty and 
punishment for the crime charged must 
not in any way affect your decision 
as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. 
(R. 78) (a copy of the above instruction is contained in addendum 
A) . 
B. Plain Error Standard 
As acknowledged by defendant in his brief, he did not 
object to the trial court's handling of the venire voir dire, nor 
did he object to the adequacy of the court's instructions to the 
subsequently impaneled jury. Br. of App. at 14. As further 
acknowledged by defendant, his failure to object below precludes 
an appellate challenge unless he is able to demonstrate plain 
error. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. To establish plain error, 
defendant must show that 1) the trial court erred, 2) the alleged 
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error should have been obvious, and 3) the alleged error was 
harmful because it undermines this Court's confidence in the 
verdict ultimately rendered. Id.: State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
C. Proper Venire Voir Dire 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court 
committed error under the first prong of the plain error 
analysis. Although a sitting jury is not generally instructed 
concerning the penalty to be imposed upon a guilty defendant in a 
non-capital,1 and/or a non-insanity defense case such as this, 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988), the trial 
court's mention of, and inquiry concerning the applicable 
penalties for purposes of venire voir dire does not constitute 
error. 
Indeed, it is well established that venire "voir dire 
examination has as its proper purposes both the detection of 
actual bias, and the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of the peremptory challenge." State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 
439, 447 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). Accord Commonwealth v. 
White, 531 A.2d 806, 808-09 (Pa.Super. 1987) ("Voir dire 
questions are asked to determine whether a prospective juror "is 
willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and 
render a verdict according to the evidence.11), appeal denied, 553 
A.2d 967 (Pa. 1988). The trial court's venire voir dire in this 
1
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1995) (in a capital 
case, the jury may also determine punishment in a bifurcated 
proceeding). 
11 
c a s e p r u p e n y d i i u i u c u uxie pci-Luxes cui u p p u i t u i u u y LU c A p i u i c 
whether any venire member held a particular penalty bias and, 
consequently, to ensure that the jury impaneled could reach an 
impartial decision unencumbered by irrelevant concerns over the 
applicable penalties. Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447. But cf. Salt 
Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah App. 1987) 
(affirming trial court's refusal to allow defendant to voir dire 
prospective jurors concerning their opinions of the potential 
sentence on the ground it "may invite confusion on the jury's 
part as to their proper role in the trial"). 
Importantly, the trial court did not suggest to the 
venire that the impaneled jury could potentially effect any 
aspect of the imposition of penalties upon a guilty verdict. 
See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 
1966) (held error for trial court to instruct deliberating jury 
that it could recommend leniency in order to avoid a mistrial). 
Rather, the court further informed the venire that the impaneled 
jury would try the facts only, and that the applicable penalties 
were "fixed by law" (R. 17, 34), see addendum A. So couched, the 
trial court's venire voir dire concerning the applicable 
penalties cannot reasonably be interpreted to have confused the 
subsequently impaneled jury as to their sole fact-finding role. 
Based on the above, the trial court's mention of, and 
inquiry concerning the potential penalties in this case does not 
constitute erroneous instruction, but rather proper venire voir 
dire. Tavlor, 664 P.2d at 447. Defendant has thus failed to 
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establish one of the requirements of the plain error standard and 
his claim must fail. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. 
D. No Obvious Error 
For the same reasons that the trial court's voir dire 
of the venire does not amount to error, it cannot constitute 
obvious error. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. Further, defendant's 
brief is devoid of any controlling authority indicating that a 
trial court's voir dire concerning the venire's attitudes on the 
potential penalties is always error. Rather, defendant relies on 
Davidson (discussed in part C, supra), which relates to the 
potential problems encountered when a trial court formally 
instructs an empaneled and/or deliberating jury concerning the 
applicable punishments. Br. of App. at 15-17. As set forth 
above, such is not the case here. 
Defendant also points to model jury instructions 
developed by the Utah Chapter of the Federal Bar Association to 
support his claim of obvious error. Br. of App. at 19. 
Specifically, defendant relies on Federal Bar Association 
Criminal Instruction No. 17: 
The punishment provided by law for 
the offense charged in the indictment 
is a matter exclusively within the 
province of the Court, and should 
never be considered by the jury in 
any way in arriving at an impartial 
verdict as to the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. 
Defendant concedes that the instruction "may not be controlling 
on the trial court," but asserts that the instruction, "with the 
case law--serve[s] to put the court on notice as to the general 
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< 
assertion wholly fails to establish how the existence of the 
federal model instruction suffices to alert a state trial court 
that it is committing obvious error by informing the jury venire 
i 
of the prospective penalties, a subject the federal model 
instruction does not address. 
E. Curative Instruction Defeats Claim of Prejudice 
l 
More importantly, defendant fails to point out that the 
trial court did in fact instruct the impaneled jury along the 
lines of the federal model instruction (R. 78), see addendum A. 
i 
This failure undermines defendant's claim of prejudice. See, 
e.g., State v. Koch, 673 P.2d 297, 304 (Ariz. 1983) (erroneous 
penalty instruction that was accompanied by a proper instruction 
advising jury that it was not to consider the possible punishment 
in reaching its verdict held to defeat claim of prejudice); 
United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 255 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(curative instruction adequate to eliminate any possible 
prejudice resulting from court's earlier inadvertent reference to 
penalty). Defendant wholly fails to demonstrate that the court's 
subsequent instruction to the impaneled jury that it must ignore 
the potential punishments was inadequate to cure any alleged 
error. Thus, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, 
the Court must presume the jury followed the trial court's 
instruction and did not consider the potential penalties in 
arriving at their verdict. See State v. Reay, 810 P.2d 512, 517 
n.6 (Wash. App.) ("A jury is presumed to follow the court's 
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instructions and that presumption will prevail until it is 
overcome by a showing otherwise."), review denied, 816 P.2d 1225 
(Wash. 1991). 
In sum, defendant fails to establish that the trial 
court's voir dire constituted error, that the alleged error was 
obvious, or that he suffered any unfair prejudice. The Court may 
reject his claim on any one of these grounds. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
at 403. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT PAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
OF PLAIN ERROR REGARDING THE PRECISE 
TERMINOLOGY AND ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS 
LISTED IN ELEMENTS INSTRUCTIONS ##4-
5; INDEED, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS 
FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT 
Defendant claims that elements instructions ##4-5 
constitute prejudicial error because they required the jury to 
find that counts II and/or III constituted prior violations of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1995), instead of prior 
convictions of the statute, consistent with the precise 
terminology of section 58-37-8 (1) (b). Br. of App. at 21-25. 
Defendant further claims the instructions were erroneously 
prejudicial because the jury was instructed that it could not 
convict for the drug offenses charged in counts II and/or III, 
unless it first convicted defendant for the drug offense charged 
in count I as a prior violation of the drug statute. Br. of App. 
at 21-25. 
As he did in Point I, supra. defendant acknowledges 
that he did not object to the trial court's elements 
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instructions, but claims that the issue is nonetheless properly 
before the Court on grounds of plain error. Br. of App. at 22. 
Because defendant fails to demonstrate any error, let alone an 
obvious and prejudicial error in the trial court's elements 
instructions, his claim should be rejected. State v. Menzies. 
889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994). 
A. The Trial Court Properly 
Instructed the Jury Using the Term 
Violation in Lieu of the Term 
Conviction 
Section 58-37-8 (1) (b) provides for enhanced penalties 
for repeated violations of the subsection (1)(a): 
Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(ii) a substance classified in 
Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and 
upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this 
subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that it could 
not convict defendant for the drug distribution offense alleged 
in count II unless it determined "beyond a reasonable doubt" that 
the offense "was a second or subsequent violation occurring after 
a previous violation of the same statute" (R. 101) (a copy of 
jury instruction #4 is contained in Addendum B). The court 
similarly instructed the jury concerning the drug distribution 
offense alleged in count III, requiring the jury to determine 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that that offense also constituted "a 
second or subsequent violation occurring after a previous 
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violation of the same statute" (R. 100)(a copy of jury 
instruction #5 is contained in Addendum B). 
1. No Demonstration of Error 
While it is sometimes desirable for jury instructions 
to track the statutory language "as closely as possible," State 
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986), trial courts are not 
required to use exact statutory terminology in their jury 
instructions. State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) 
(dismissing as frivolous defendant's claim that instruction 
failed to correctly state statutory presumption because the court 
used the non-statutory term "fails," instead of the statutory 
term "no"). Indeed, it is occasionally error to instruct the 
jury according to the strict statutory language. See, e.g., 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985) ("a jury 
instruction using the language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1) is 
unconstitutional because it directly relates to the issue of 
guilt and relives the State of its burden of proof"); State v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986) (same). Cf. State v. 
Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1981) ("it is not erroneous in all 
instances to instruct the jury in the language of the statute if 
the jury is not likely to be confused or misled"). A more 
appropriate concern than whether the instructions precisely track 
the use and order of the statutory terminology is whether the 
given instructions accurately state the law. Accordingly, 
"beyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the 
jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left 
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to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Aly, 782 < 
P.2d 549, 550 (UtahApp. 1989), 
In the present case, defendant's nominal assertion of 
error fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its ( 
discretion in using the term violation in lieu of the term 
conviction according to the exact phraseology of section 58-37-
8(1)(b), nor has he shown that the instructions did not i 
accurately state the law. Specifically, defendant claims that 
the term conviction as used in section 58-37-8(1) (b) "has a 
legally different and more serious--meaning [sic] than does the < 
term 'violation,'" br. of app. at 22-23, but fails to suggest a 
definition for either term or to otherwise explain the alleged 
difference between the two terms for purposes of section 58-37- , 
8(1)(b). Defendant further fails to support his claim of error 
with any authority. See State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 
(Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach unsupported argument). 
More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court recently 
clarified that the term conviction as used in section 58-37-
8(1)(b) means "the determination of guilt by a verdict or plea 
rather than by a judgment of conviction." State v. Hunt, No. 
940267, slip op. at 4 (Utah November 9, 1995)(emphasis added). 
Thus, for purposes of section 58-37-8(1)(b),"a conviction on one 
count in an information can be a legal basis for enhancing other 
convictions based on counts charged in the same information." 
Id. To construe the term conviction as used in section 58-37-
8(1)(b) according to its other common meaning, denoting "the 
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final judgment entered on the plea or verdict," would 
"unnecessarily waste judicial resources." Id. As noted in 
Hunt,"[t]he prosecution could circumvent the multicount 
enhancement dilemma simply by charging each count in a separate 
information," resulting in three trials, "consuming three times 
the resources." Id. In short, Hunt makes clear that a prior 
judgment of conviction is not required in order for the penalty 
enhancement of section 58-37-8(1)(b) to apply. Thus, the 
instructions are neither incorrect or misleading regarding the 
requirements of section 58-37-8(1)(b). Cf. State v. Lopez, 789 
P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990) (no error in refusing defendant's 
requested instruction where instructions given to the jury 
"directly parallel the statutory language and correctly instruct 
on the applicable law"). 
2. No Allegation of Obvious Error 
Notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate any error in 
the trial court's use of the term violation, defendant's brief is 
devoid of any allegation or explication of obvious error. See 
Br. of App. at 21-25. This failure by itself constitutes 
sufficient grounds for the Court to reject defendant's claim of 
plain error regarding the wording of the elements instructions 
given. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. 
3. No Demonstration of Prejudice 
Defendant's claim of plain error regarding the trial 
court's use of the term violation can also be rejected based on 
his failure to demonstrate any resultant prejudice. Menzies. 889 
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P.2d at 403. Defendant's claim of prejudice is based on his 
conclusory allegation that the evidence supporting counts I and 
II was thin as compared to the evidence supporting count III. 
Br. of App. at 24-25. Accordingly, defendant supposes that 
the jury was pondering a 'not guilty' 
verdict for Counts I and II, but were 
swayed from such a more favorable 
result by the language of jury 
instruction[s] 4 and 5 which required 
a finding of guilt under Count I 
before a finding of guilt could be 
made under Count[s] II and III. 
Br. of App. at 25-26. Defendant's supposition is based on the 
fact that the deliberating jury submitted the following written 
question to the trial court: 
The 3rd charge, instruction #5, element #7 refers to this char 
as a subsequent violation. If count one and count two are 'not 
guilty,' can a guilty verdict be given for count 3 [?] 
(R. 106) (a copy is contained in Addendum B). The trial court 
responded by writing, "No" on the same piece of paper as the 
jury's question and returning it to the deliberating jurors. Id. 
Defendant's claim of prejudice cannot succeed unless it 
is presumed that the jury wholly disregarded the trial court's 
considerable instructions regarding the reasonable doubt 
standard. Indeed, as noted previously, elements instruction #4 
instructed the jury that in order to find defendant guilty for 
the offense charged in count I, it "must" find that each of the 
essential elements was established beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 
102), see addendum B. Elements instruction #5 similarly 
instructed that in order to find defendant guilty of count II, 
the jury "must" find that the essential elements, including the 
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fact that count II constituted "a second or subsequent violation 
occurring after a previous violation of the same statute" were 
established beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 101-02), see addendum 
B. Further, each of the elements instructions for counts I-III 
concluded as follows: 
If the State has failed to prove to 
your satisfaction beyond a reasonable 
doubt any one or more of the above 
essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the 
defendant not guilty. On the other 
hand, if the State has proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt all of the 
essential elements of the offense as 
above set forth, then you should find 
the defendant guilty of the charge. 
(R. 102-100), see addendum B. 
In addition to the foregoing elements instructions, the 
trial court explained the significance of circumstantial 
evidence, reiterating that "each fact which is essential to 
complete a set of circumstance [sic] necessary to establish the 
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each 
fact or circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 85) (a copy is 
contained in Addendum B). Finally, the trial court instructed 
the jury as to the definition of reasonable doubt (R. 92) (a copy 
is contained in Addendum B). Defendant does not dispute the 
adequacy of the above instructions to inform the jury of the 
reasonable doubt standard and/or its duty to hold the State to 
that standard in proving each element of its case against 
defendant. Br. of App. at 21-26. Where, as here, a jury is 
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correctly instructed, the Court must presume the jury followed 
those instructions. State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 623 (Idaho 
1991) ("Where the jury instructions taken as a whole, correctly 
state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and 
fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due 
consideration to the whole charge contained in all the 
instructions and was not mislead by any isolated portion 
thereof.''); State v. Reay. 810 P.2d 512, 517 n.6 (Wash. App.) 
("A jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions and that 
presumption will prevail until it is overcome by a showing 
otherwise."), review denied, 816 P.2d 1225 (Wash. 1991); Jones v. 
State, 764 P.2d 914 (Okl.Cr.App. 1988) ("The presumption is that 
jurors are true to their oaths and conscientiously observe their 
instructions and admonitions"); State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366, 377 
(Ariz. 1981) ("[T]here is no presumption that jurors will disobey 
instructions given them by the court"), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 
983 (1982). Cf. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989) 
("Given the erroneous instruction, it is impossible for us to 
determine or presume that the jury properly performed its 
weighing function."), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 163 
(1995). Defendant makes no contrary argument. 
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate 
either error or obvious error with reference to the trial court's 
use of the term violation in elements instructions ##4-5. 
Because he cannot demonstrate that the jury failed to heed the 
trial court's instructions concerning the reasonable doubt 
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standard, he further fails to demonstrate any unfair prejudice. 
The Court may reject his claim on any one of these grounds. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403., 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
B. Error, if Any, in Requiring Jury 
to Find That Counts II and/or III 
Constituted Second or Subsequent 
Offenses Was Favorable to Defendant 
Defendant's remaining allegation of plain error 
regarding instructions ##4-5 rests on the fact that the trial 
court instructed the jury that it could not convict defendant for 
counts II and III unless it first determined that those offenses 
constituted second or subsequent violations of section 58-37-
8(1)(b). Br. of App. at 23-24. Defendant suggests that this 
determination was a sentencing enhancement to be determined by 
the court, not the jury. Br. of App. at 23. While it may be 
more desirable to leave for the trial court the question of 
whether a violation constitutes a second or subsequent conviction 
for purposes of section 58-37-8(1) (b), the failure to do so does 
not constitute grounds for reversal. 
1. No Allegation of Obvious Error 
In support of his claim of error, defendant cites case 
law interpreting the firearm enhancement statute and holding that 
there is no requirement that the jury make a specific finding 
that a firearm was used in the commission of a crime before the 
sentence can be enhanced under that statute. In State v. Angus, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that the defendant had made no such 
request and that on the facts of that case, such a requirement 
would have been "nonsensical." 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978). 
23 
Defendant also points to State v. Labrum, wherein this Court 
similarly ruled that any error in not requiring the jury to 
specifically find that a firearm was used prior to enhancing 
defendant's sentence was "harmless indeed." 881 P.2d 900, 905 
(Utah App. 1994). cert, granted on other grounds, 892 P.2d 13 
(Utah 1995). 
There is nothing in either of the above firearm 
enhancement cases that would have suggested to the instant trial 
court that its instructions requiring the jury to find that 
counts II and III constituted second or subsequent offenses under 
section 58-37-8(1) (b) before it could convict for either offense 
was obviously erroneous. Defendant makes no contrary argument. 
See Br. of App. at 21-25. Defendant's failure to allege that the 
claimed error should have been obvious to the trial court is, as 
noted previously, sufficient reason to reject his claim of plain 
error. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. 
Moreover, in holding that the failure to require a 
special jury finding was not error, Angus, 581 P.2d at 995, or at 
the most, harmless error, Labrum, 881 P.2d at 905, both cases 
suggest that there are circumstances when such a requirement is 
proper, e.g., when requested by defendant. Angus, 581 P.2d at 
995. Significantly, while defendant did not request the instant 
elements instructions, he did not object either (R. 161 at T. 
424). For reasons set forth below, defendant's failure to object 
below may well have been based on the fact that any error in 
instructions ##4-5 was favorable. 
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2. Favorable Error 
Indeed, by requiring the jury to find that counts II 
and III constituted second or subsequent violations of the drug 
statute before it could convict on either count, the trial court 
essentially required the jury to find more elements than actually 
required by section 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)2. That any error in so 
requiring was favorable to defendant is highlighted by the jury's 
question as to whether it could convict for count III if it did 
not first convict for counts I and II (R. 106), see addendum B. 
In responding negatively to the jury's question, the trial court 
essentially instructed the jury to acquit defendant of all three 
counts if it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant was guilty as charged in count I. Id. If, on the 
other hand, the jury had been instructed as now requested by 
defendant, excluding any requirement that counts II and III must 
constitute second or subsequent violations of section 58-37-
8(1)(a), defendant ran the risk of being convicted for counts II 
and III, regardless of the jury's decision to convict or not for 
count I. In short, such an instruction would have made it even 
more likely that defendant would be convicted on all three 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) provides: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: . . . 
distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance. 
25 
(Utah 1980) (no ground for reversal where any prejudice caused by 
erroneous jury instruction was favorable to the defendant). 
Notably, defendant did not object to counts I-III 
being tried together, thus requiring the jury to refer back to 
and convict defendant for count I before it could convict him for 
count II and/or count III did not require the jury to consider 
any uncharged conduct that it would not otherwise be entitled to 
consider. See, e.g.. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 
1989) (interpreting homicide statute as requiring a bifurcated 
proceeding when underlying homicide charge is subject to sentence 
enhancement based on separately charged crimes or bad acts). See 
also Hunt, No. 940267, slip op. at 4 (holding that a conviction 
on the first count of an information under drug statute may serve 
as the basis for enhancing the penalty on subsequent counts 
''irrespective of the timing of the offenses or the employment of 
a separate or multicount information"). 
Based on the above, defendant demonstrates no obvious 
nor unfavorable error regarding the requirement in elements 
instructions ##4-5 that the offenses charged in counts II and III 
must constitute second or subsequent violations of the drug 
statute. He thus fails to demonstrate plain error and his claim 
should be rejected. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
Even though errors may not individually warrant 
reversal, this Court may still reverse where the errors 
cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 
(Utah 1993). Defendant claims that the trial court's alleged 
errors in the voir dire of the jury venire, and the wording of 
elements instructions ##4-5, including the added element that 
counts II-III must constitute second or subsequent violations of 
section 58-37-8(1) (a) , together constitute cumulative error. 
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons. 
First, defendant fails to adequately support his claim 
of cumulative error. He merely asserts that if the individual 
errors do not warrant reversal, then the cumulative effect of 
them does, but he provides no meaningful explanation of why this 
is so. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the 
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant 
failed to provide any supporting legal authority or analysis). 
Rather, defendant reasserts the individual claims of error and 
merely speculates as to the possible cumulative prejudicial 
effect. 
Second, for the reasons argued above, no unfavorable 
error exists in this case. Indeed, defendant's assertion of 
cumulative error cannot succeed unless he first establishes that 
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some error occurred. maimer, oou r.za at. :ou, rui icd&uu& 
detailed in Point I, supra. defendant fails to establish any 
error in the trial court's venire voir dire. Nor has he 
established any error in the trial court's use of the term 
violation in elements instructions ##4-5. See Point 11(A), 
supra. To the extent there was any error in the number of 
elements listed in instructions ##4-5, that error is not 
1 
reversible either alone or cumulatively because it was favorable 
to defendant. See Point 11(B), supra. Because the actions about 
which defendant complains, if erroneous, were favorably so, the 
Court need not consider whether the cumulative effect of these 
actions undermines confidence in the outcome. Palmer, 86 0 P.2d 
at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous 
i 
individually harmless errors before concluding that the 
cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome).3 
POINT IV 
i 
DEFENDANT WAS EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY 
TRIAL COUNSEL 
As an alternative means for reviewing on appeal the 
above claimed errors concerning the trial court's venire voir 
dire and elements instructions ##4-5, defendant asserts that he 
was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Br. of 
3
 Defendant has withdrawn his former Point III, see 
Supp. Br. of App. filed on November 1, 1995, including his claim 
that the alleged cumulative prejudicial effect of the above 
claimed errors would have been "obvious" if the non-presiding 
judge who responded to the jury's written question had notified 
the parties before responding to the question. Compare Br. of 
App. at 34 and Supp. Br. of App. at 2-3. See also (Supp. R. 173-
180) . 
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App. at 35-38, In reviewing a claim of counsel ineffectiveness, 
this Court indulges a "strong presumption" that counsel's conduct 
fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 
822 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1955)), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). To 
succeed under this alternative theory, defendant must demonstrate 
that trial counsel performed deficiently, or that counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," 
and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the trial 
outcome. Id. 
This Court has recognized that "plain error" and 
"ineffective assistance" claims, raised for the first time on 
appeal, share "a common standard." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124 n.15 (Utah 1989)). Indeed, to be successful under either 
theory defendant must demonstrate prejudice or a substantial 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent the plain error 
and/or the deficient performance of trial counsel. Id. A 
defendant who fails to meet the plain error requirement of 
prejudice likewise fails to meet the required showing under the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard. Id. Because the 
plain error and counsel effectiveness tests so closely resemble 
one another, and for brevity's sake, the State's plain error 
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analysis' of the issues raised in Points I-II of defendant's 
brief apply here. Indeed, this Court "may choose not to consider 
the adequacy of counsel's performance" if it determines that the 
claimed errors in Points I-II of defendant's brief were not 
harmful. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1227 (Utah 1993). 
In any event, for the same reasons that the trial 
court's venire voir dire did not constitute error, trial counsel 
did not perform deficiently by not raising an objection. See 
Point 1(C), supra. Additionally, for the same reasons that 
elements instructions ##4-5 did not constitute either incorrect 
or misleading instruction, trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently when he did not object thereto. See, Point 11(A), 
supra. Finally, for reasons set forth in Point 11(B), supra, any 
error resulting from the additional requirements in instructions 
##4-5 that the jury could not convict for counts II and/or III 
without first convicting for count I was favorable to defendant. 
Consequently, trial counsel exercised sound trial strategy by not 
objecting to the above claimed errors. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. 
In short, defendant fails to make out ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the same reasons he failed to establish 
plain error. His claims of ineffective assistance should be 
rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, this case presents no grounds for 
reversal and the Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P day of December, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
you stand again, raise your right hand. And the 
clerk of the court is going to administer a 
second oath to you for that purpose. If you'll 
all stand, please. 
THE CLERK: Raise your right hands, 
please. 
You and each of you do solemnly swear that 
you will true answers make to such questions as 
shall be put to you touching your qualifications 
to serve as jurors in the case now pending 
before the Court so help you God. 
(Whereupon, the trial jurors nodded and/or 
spoke in the affirmative.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. I've advised 
you that this is a drug case. And I will, on 
the record once again, advise you of the nature 
of the charges involved. 
Counsel, have there been any amended 
criminal informations filed since the initial 
information? 
MR. TAYLOR: I don't believe so, Your 
Honor. 
MR. ZABRISKIE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then it's the State of 
Utah V Juan Anthony Portillo. 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
Count 1 is distribution or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance* That's a 
third-degree felony. That's punishable by 
incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate period of time, not to exceed five 
years, together with up to a $5,000 fine and/or 
both--
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, may we 
approach the bench briefly? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
( Off the record at the bench, not 
reported.) 
MR. TAYLOR: For the record, the State 
moves to amend the information in Count 4. It 
is charged as a second-degree felony, which 
should have been charged as a third-degree 
felony. It's not a substantive change, merely 
changes that one number. 
MR. ZABRISKIE: No objections, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Back to the criminal charge* Count 2, 
ladies and gentlemen, is distribution of or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
That's a second-degree felony. It's also 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
punishable by an indeterminate time at the Utah 
State Prison, not less than one nor more than 15 
years in the Utah State Prison, together with up 
to a $10,000 fine and/or both. 
Count 3 is distribution of or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, also a 
second-degree felony. It would carry a maximum, 
also, for an indeterminate time, not less than 
one nor more than 15 years in the Utah State 
Prison together with a fine not to exceed 
$10,000 and/or both. 
Count 4 is possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. That's 
a third-degree felony, carrying the possible 
imposition of an indeterminate time from zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison together 
with a fine up to $5,000 and/or both. 
Count 5 is unlawful possession or use of 
drug paraphenalia. That's a class-B 
misdemeanor. It's punishable by incarceration 
in the Utah County Jail for a period not to 
exceed six months together with a fine up to 
$1,000 and/or both. 
And Count 6 is illegal drug tax. That's a 
third-degree felony. That's also punishable by 
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an indeterminate time in the Utah State Prison 
not to exceed five years together with a fine up 
to $5,000 and/or both. 
You, as jurors, will be the triers of the 
fact-- its sole and exclusive triers of the fact 
and make a determination in this case what the 
facts are. Ultimately this Court will advise you 
what the law is and the proper application of 
that a law. But the facts are your sole and 
exclusive domain. 
You'll be required to listen very closely 
and listen to evidence that is presented and 
testimony that's given, and make, ultimately, a 
determination about credibility of witnesses and 
who is to believe-- be believed in this case. 
We'll conduct what we call now voir dire. 
It's the opportunity for the Court to make some 
inquiry. 
And, first of all, I believe what I will do 
is I'll have each of you stand, advise the Court 
of your name, the city of your residence-- not 
your street address-- and then advise, for the 
record, where you work, if you do work, whether 
or not you're married or not, and whether your 
spouse works. And then we'll follow up with 
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had any other basis upon which you might have 
some knowledge of this case, any notoriety 
whatsoever? 
(No audible response.) 
THE COURT: Has anyone ever been an 
adverse party to the defendant in a civil case 
or any proceeding? Is there anyone that 
believes that the punishment fixed by law is too 
severe or too light for the offenses charged? 
(No audible response.) 
THE COURT: Is there any reason best 
known to yourself why you could not try the case 
fairly and impartially upon the evidence and 
without any bias or prejudice for or against 
either party? 
(No audible response.) 
THE COURT: If you were a party to this 
action-- either the plaintiff, the State of 
Utah, or the defendant, Mr. Portillo-- would you 
be fully satisfied to have your cause tried by a 
person of your present attitude and frame of 
mind towards this case? 
(No audible response.) 
THE COURT: Is there anyone that 
because of medical or mental or emotional 
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INSTRUCTION NO. SL$> 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a 
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings. The 
penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any way 
affect your decision as to the guilty or innocence of the lf/s*t 
defendant. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of Count I: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following 
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. On or about October 9, 1991, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly and intentionally, 
5. Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute, 
6. Marijuana. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential 
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not 
guilty. On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the 
charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. V 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of Count II: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following 
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. On or about October 15, 1991, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly and intentionally, 
5. Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute, 
6. Marijuana, 
7. That this distribution was a second or subsequent 
violation occurring after a previous violation of the same 
statute. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential 
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not 
guilty. On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the 
charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. t> 
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of Count III: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute 
a Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following 
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. On or about October 25, 1991, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Knowingly and intentionally, 
5. Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute, 
6. Marijuana, 
7. That this distribution was a second or subsequent 
violation occurring after a previous violation of the same 
statute. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential 
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not 
guilty. On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the 
charge. 
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INSTRUCTION f ' 
The burden of proof described as "beyond a reasonable 
doubtH is used and/or referred to in several places in these 
Instructions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to be an absolute certainty. A reasonable doubt is based 
on reason and common sense and not on speculation or imagination. 
It is a doubt that is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy the mind and 
convince those who are bound to act conscientiously upon such 
proof. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable men and 
women would hold after consideration of the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO- 2-° 
However, a finding of a guilty as to any crime may not be 
based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances 
are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other 
rational conclusion. 
Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of 
circumstance necessary to establish the defendant's guilt must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon 
which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Also, if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two 
reasonable interpretations, onfof which points to the defendant's 
guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that 
interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and 
reject that interpretation which points to his guilt. 
If, on the other hand one interpretation of such evidence 
appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be 
unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable 
interpretation and to reject the unreasonable. 
:• 85 
F I L E D 
c
* r » - •.i'.'f-.O':;-.'!•: fo-jrt of 
V V i i l V 
.7^ 3^r^^y S y flS^Sttftf*! 
.jO wui/i cJwA&t m? ^ 
\ , 
f c&iupj P^up a^<S Cex^f^ 
-&V-C MS W % W ^ 
Jtn^ C^7*4v 5 • 
t^-£*>\ 
ADDENDUM C 
91 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
(10) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the 
database by misrepresentation or fraud is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(11) (a) A person may not knowingly and intentionally use, release, publish, 
or otherwise make available to any other person or entity any information 
obtained from the database for any purpose other than those specified in 
Subsection (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a third degree 
felony and is also subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection 
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative 
proceedings within the division. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in 
the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the 
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a 
specific written request for the information or when the division deter-
mines the individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit the 
information as required is grounds for the division to take the following 
actions in accordance with Section 58-1*401: 
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each 
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is 
not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi) shall be deposited 
in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection 
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative 
proceedings within the division. 
(18) An individual who has submitted information to the database in 
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted 
the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and 
operate the database shall be funded by appropriations from the General 
Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any 
resources within the Commerce Service Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
tins section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet. 
Hirforr C 1S6S, 8M7.7A, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Ltwt 1995, eh. S33,14 
1I9S, eh. aSS, I a. mskat the set tfftctm <m July 1,1995. 
58-37-8. Prohib i ted acts — Penal t ies . 
(1) Prohibited acta A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a 'child* as defined in Section 
78-3a*2, and 'emergency9 means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
